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  Wayne Bowman
Abstract
This brief essay draws upon a number of themes introduced in
Carolyn Korsmeyer's recent book Gender and Aesthetics: An
Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2004; ISBN:
0415266599). It does not attempt a comprehensive or critical
review of her book; instead it focuses selectively on certain of
her points in order to raise concerns of some significance to
the music education discipline and, perhaps, to philosophical
aesthetics.[1]
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1. Introduction
Historically, the notion that musical experience should be
considered a subset of what is called "aesthetic experience"
has figured prominently in arguments designed to convince
skeptics that studying music is of general educational
importance and thus should be taught in schools. This
aesthetic rationale[2] - the effort to rationalize on aesthetic
grounds how music is essential to human growth and
development - served not only to persuade others skeptical of
the significance of the efforts of music educators, but also to
shore up, collectively and individually, music educators' sense
of worth. It became, as result, tightly linked to their sense of
disciplinary and personal identity. Only the nature of the
aesthetic on which this rationale was based and from which,
subsequently, significant parts of music teachers' identities
were crafted, was seldom subjected to thorough or critical
scrutiny. Indeed, it could be argued that its utility was due in
no small part to an elusiveness and vagueness that permitted
its use wherever an affirmative adjective was needed:
aesthetic this, aesthetic that, aesthetic whatever.[3] The term
gained considerable currency as a loose synonym for
expression, for feeling, for creativity, for beauty, for profundity
and, it seemed, often for genuine or authentic musicality itself.
In such circumstances, to criticize the aesthetic rationale for
music education was to undermine the very possibility of
musical value, to say nothing of the honor and integrity of
music educators for whom aesthetic sensitivity had become
the sine qua non of educational credibility. Thus, a way of
understanding certain aspects of certain music and of
explaining some of the reasons some music might be
important became the key to the nature and value of all music
everywhere and, for many people, the entire point of music
education. This is not to deny that there were those who had
carefully considered what a specifically musical variant of an
aesthetic experience might entail, understandings that were
judiciously circumscribed and qualified. But these fragile and
contingent understandings were eventually transformed into
ideologies,[4] buttressed frequently by the kind of doctrinal

fervor that characterizes doubt as betrayal.
In the waning years of the twentieth century, the debates over
the aesthetic rationale for music education became more
heated. To those not philosophically inclined, these arguments
may have seemed much ado about nothing: differences of
personal opinion that were a source of embarrassment,
undermining music education's professional solidarity,
credibility and integrity.[5] However, with the passage of time,
some of the profession's defensiveness toward critiques of the
aesthetic rationale has begun to subside. It has become
increasingly apparent that the notion of aesthetic value at the
center of this rhetorical storm was not, in fact, the timeless
absolute its advocates had claimed it was. And the
consequences of relinquishing these claims to the universality
and neutral objectivity of aesthetic doctrines have shown
themselves to be not only less dire than many had expected
but beneficial in many respects.[6]
We have become increasingly aware that the aesthetic
rationale for the benefits of music study, instead of being
based on music's innermost essences, was, like the notion of
the aesthetic itself, a cultural construction. Like most cultural
constructions, it emerged as a way of addressing particular
sociocultural problems and concerns, and it owed its continued
existence to its efficacy in addressing those needs and
interests.[7] But human needs and interests change over time.
Among the important things we have come to realize about
human needs and interests is that they tend not to be the
universal sorts of things we once took comfort in believing they
were.
Human needs and interests are nearly as various as humans
themselves. Since theories are tools that are crafted in service
of certain ends (which is to say, certain needs and interests),
it is seldom the case that a given theory, however efficacious
it may be for certain uses, is equally efficacious for all.
Theories are abstractions, selective in the evidence upon which
they draw and valid, when they are valid, for purposes related
to their intended uses. They validate certain kinds of data
while marginalizing others. As musical and educational voices
representing different needs and interests have demanded to
be heard, the adequacy of the aesthetic rationale has become
increasingly suspect.
The needs and interests served by the idea of aesthetic value
never were universal; rather, they were the needs and
interests of certain social groups. The claims to universality,
objective neutrality, absolute status and the like served to
advance these needs and interests as though they were
everyone's, to silence competing needs and interests, and to
bifurcate the world of music into the genuine (the aesthetically
valuable) and an illegitimate, inferior remainder. This was
neither the best way to understand music, nor was it
particularly becoming of a profession committed to musical
education.
2. Korsmeyer's Critique
To be clear, Korsmeyer's book does not advance explicitly the
argument outlined above. Nor, for that matter, is it concerned
with music education per se; nor even, extensively, with

music. But among my reasons for examining it here is that it
puts together, even in its title, things that conventional
aesthetic doctrines have insisted we keep apart. It provides,
among other things, an accessible accounting of the historicity
of the concepts of art, fine art, artistry, aesthetic value,
aesthetic experience, beauty, expression and more, and of the
various ways these have incorporated and perpetuated
gendered stereotypes that subvert the needs, interests and
actions of women.
I will not pursue here the important relations and distinctions
between gender and feminist concerns. Instead, I want to
draw selectively on Korsmeyer's analysis to point out the ways
that ideas like art, the aesthetic and beauty, as gendered
constructs, undermine the comforting, inspiring claims
traditionally made on their behalf by the music education
profession.[8] The first three chapters of Korsmeyer's book
support this effort very well.
The notion of the artist, Korsmeyer reminds us, "is inseparable
from ideas about what counts as 'art'" (p. 15); and what
counts as art has varied dramatically over the centuries of
recorded history on the subject: ". . .the products that count
as art . . . have a history that shifts in tandem alongside the
changing idea of the artist" (p. 16). What emerged in the
modern period, however - the period, not coincidentally, from
which the idea of the aesthetic also emerged - was the notion
of the artist as "a fully autonomous individual who creates for
the sake of creation alone" (p. 10). An important corollary to
this concept of the artist and, more generally, artistry, was a
conceptual and practical division between fine and practical or
applied arts, often parallel to the more general distinction
between art and craft. The concept of fine art "singles out
works [and by extension, artist/producers of such works [9]
that are produced for their aesthetic value alone" (p. 26, italics
in original), in distinction, that is, from works or actions that
are functional, practical and utilitarian. Thus, the end of art is
beauty and beauty alone. As Victor Cousin put it in 1818,
"utility has nothing to do with beauty" (p. 27).
"The notion of aesthetic value," Korsmeyer explains, "emerged
from new approaches to pleasure and to the receptivity and
appreciation that were summed up in the idea of 'taste'" (p.
28). Good taste was grounded in aesthetic pleasures,
pleasures contrasted to those associated with action, use,
economic value, social meaning and bodily gratification. To
have good taste, then, was to take aesthetic pleasure in the
full and proper apprehension of polite things designed solely
for that end: works of art created by artists for the sole
purpose of aesthetic gratification. True art was, as the saying
goes, "for art's sake": for appreciative rather than practical
engagement. Connection to any other praxis either diminished
its artistic value or disqualified it from artistic
consideration.[10]
This opposition between the beautiful and the practical was
also evident in the idea of the artistic genius, a creative
individual with a "powerfully original mind" capable of "vaulting
over" conventions and rules to "discover entirely new ways of
conceiving and acting. . .." (p. 30). That this unique,
imaginative creative capacity (genius) was attributed to the

male mind is hardly coincidental, once one sees the ways
these various notions interconnect. The idea of fine art
precludes by definition many of the endeavors in which
women, historically relegated to the domestic rather than
public realm, were engaged. That the artist is stereotypically
male follows almost automatically; the practical nature of
women's domestic obligations assures their status as artisans
rather than artists. To plumb the depths of creative
imagination, Korsmeyer explains, required considerable
freedom: "freedom from tradition, from the fetters of social
expectation and constraint, perhaps even from family and
other responsibilities" (p. 32). Such freedoms fell primarily to
men, most often of a privileged social class; seldom were they
characteristic of women's lives and experiences.
"The noteworthy thing about the implications for the presumed
gender of the artist," writes Korsmeyer, "is that everything
that is included in the elevated category of fine art has a
typical maker who is masculine, to the point that for some art
forms women were actually considered unfit to participate
fully, and were diverted to lesser, adjunct roles" (p. 33).
Gender is a "systematic and occasionally insidious
phenomenon that can impart to concepts considerable power
to shape the ways we think and see the world" (p. 34). And
despite radical changes to the status of women in society since
the historic period that gave rise to these concepts, gendered
expectations about what counts as art, about who qualifies as
an artist, and about what kinds of products and experience are
worthy of such recognition or status, continue to shape belief
and value systems in ways that have undesirable
consequences.
The term "aesthetic," notes Korsmeyer, was first employed in
eighteenth century philosophy to designate a "level of
cognition that one receives from immediate sense experience
prior to the intellectual abstraction which organizes general
knowledge" (p. 37). It was soon revised, however, to refer
more broadly to the kind of insight imparted by the experience
of beauty, insight that was immediate and particular, rather
than general,[11] and intuitive rather than logical. Establishing
the validity of these particular, intuitive insights, that is, the
judgments that certain things constituted bona fide instances
of beauty, was a major preoccupation of the time. It was
therefore important to set standards for beauty and its
attendant pleasures and to distinguish genuine instances and
sources of aesthetic pleasure from imposters.[12]
Among the pleasures that might be mistaken for aesthetic
ones, thereby detracting from authentic standards of beauty,
were pleasures that were selfish, self-interested, self-serving
and/or merely personal. So the idea of aesthetic experience
came to figure prominently in the effort to distinguish the
pleasure occasioned by genuine, durable beauty from that
which was personal, sensual and fleeting. Kant's version of the
aesthetic notoriously excluded both "interested" pleasures and
conceptual orientations, in an effort to establish its "subjective
universality."[13] Although aesthetic judgments were
subjective, he sought to prove that they were not necessarily
idiosyncratic. Indeed, they were universally available to any
and all who were capable of assuming, or inclined to assume,
the correct -- i.e., aesthetic, disinterested, conceptless --

perceptual stance.
Assumptions like these helped distinguish the cultivated from
the boorish and were important parts of the machinery that
helped distinguish the socially privileged from those less so at
a time when an emerging middle class made such distinctions
matters of considerable concern to those being displaced.[14]
This much is well known. But as Korsmeyer also explains, "the
ideal aesthetic judge, the arbiter of taste, was implicitly male,
for men's minds and sentiments were considered to be more
broadly capable than women's" (p. 46). She points, for
instance, to the "distinction between a 'feminine' taste for
things that are pretty and charming and a 'masculine' taste for
art that is more profound and difficult" (p. 47), further made
manifest in the important aesthetic distinction between the
beautiful and the sublime. Among the terms of criticism at the
time, Korsmeyer explains, was the idea of effeminacy, applied
to the work of male artists, but not women, since "a work with
similar quality by a woman would simply be feminine and
thereby charming and minor" (p. 47). In short, the quest to
establish standards for aesthetic judgments was part of a
broader quest to establish standards for pleasurable
experience; and in that quest, "the preferences of people who
were already culturally accredited" became the criteria for
determining validity. Such people were, by and large, men of
social privilege, which is to say that ideas about taste and
beauty ("aesthetic judgments") imposed standards instead of
discovering them (p. 48).
These conventional aesthetic doctrines restricting the
appreciation of beauty to those who assume the disinterested
aesthetic attitude had the effect of prohibiting questions, since
to ask questions, for example about moral or political concerns
implicated in a work of art or a piece of music, would violate
the aesthetic attitude by dragging in extraneous
considerations. "It is precisely the prohibition on asking
questions that has prompted many feminist critics to reject
this tradition in aesthetics," observes Korsmeyer (p. 50).
Indeed, convictions like these have often been used to seize
disciplinary control over music study, declaring entire ranges
of musical and musicological discourse out of bounds.[15]
These strategies of isolation and prohibition function
ideologically, suggests Korsmeyer (after Cornelia Klinger):
they are "consonant with the social subordination and
exploitation of women" (p. 51). Rejecting these aesthetic
orientations admittedly undermines the disinterestedness and
universality conventionally claimed for them. However,
Korsmeyer points out, such losses must be weighed against
the restoration to music of a crucial attribute muted by
aesthetic theories: its power.
3. Contemporary Alternative Ideas and Practices
Against the older, modernist, Enlightenment aesthetic
traditions,[16] Korsmeyer asserts, contemporary theories and
practices emphasize the reinstatement of desire. Also
influential are anti-universalist stances, grounded in
convictions that a neutral, universal point of view is not just
impossible, but politically implicated in concerns like gender,
class, nationality, and historical perspective. "Universal ideals,"
she writes, "have been replaced by the value of the particular

perspective mindful of its situation in society and history,
without pretense to universality" (p. 56). And as to the
structure of traditional aesthetic theories:
"Aesthetic objects are assigned the passive role of beinglooked-at rather than active looking; they are objects
presented for the tasteful scrutiny of the perceiver. . . .
Combined with the gendered thinking that pervades
eighteenth-century accounts of beauty, this structural
relationship can take on what we might call the form of gender
in the relationship between subject and object, a structure
that possesses traits parallel to those obtaining between
masculine and feminine positions more literally described" (p.
57).
The structure of aesthetic appreciation, in which the passive,
beautiful object stands as a feminine counterpart to the
activity and potency of the male artist, is thus poorly suited to
certain kinds of art. Its "spectator-art disjunction" does not
serve participatory or group experiences, such as musicmaking, to take a nontrivial example. "Theories of [aesthetic]
taste," Korsmeyer reminds, "are theories of connoisseurship
rather than of participation," theories that perpetuate
"assumptions about what kinds of arts are central models for
aesthetic theory" (p. 57).[17]
"The paradigm of musical composition in the fine-art system is
a work that is just to be listened to for its own beauty,
intricacy, novelty, or complexity-in short, for its aesthetic
qualities alone," Korsmeyer observes (p. 62). As we have also
seen, the notion of artistic genius was also involved. And these
modernist aesthetic ideals, writes Korsmeyer, helped create "a
climate in which women's participation in the arts was fraught
and difficult" (p. 58). In music, specifically, the inaccessibility
of the fine-art system's professional opportunities to women
assured their status as amateurs: people who performed and
created in private, often domestic environments, earning little
or nothing in recompense. "No matter how accomplished, an
amateur performance is for a relatively small audience of
intimates; its purpose is diversion or entertainment, the
musical version of decoration" (p. 68-9).
The fine-art tradition is "but one moment in the history of
art," writes Korsmeyer; and "it is one that emphasizes the
autonomy of art and the contemplative distance between
audience and artwork" (p. 99). These orientations favor
experience that is abstract and disembodied; objects or works
whose pleasures are not overly or overtly sensual; and
undertakings whose practicality or usefulness is not direct or
conspicuous. Fine art's existence is solely concerned with
experience that is said to be aesthetic; and aesthetic
gratification[18] comes of having perceived and experienced
aesthetic qualities alone. However, Korsmeyer argues, under
the fine-art orientation, women's creative engagements were
largely confined to areas that were practical, functional and
often sensual, such as food preparation, for example. They
were thus, by definition, neither artistic nor conducive to
experience that was aesthetic. Yet, she observes, "the
presence of aesthetic qualities alone does not make something
a work of art" (p. 99). There is a "deep gender bias" in the
way we have come (under aesthetic/fine-art philosophical

traditions) to understand bodily senses. Here we encounter the
"operation of gender at a level of conceptualization where the
very presumptions regulating philosophical importance are
formulated" (p. 102).[19] It is for these reasons that many
feminist interventions, both philosophical and artistic, are
committed to exposing the fundamental "error and power" of
the traditions we have been discussing here.
4. The "Difficulty" of Feminist Art
Korsmeyer's point is that much of the purported "difficulty" of
feminist art in the postmodern era stems from its rejection of
"the aesthetic values that reigned when the concept of fine art
developed in modern history" (p. 108). Conventional aesthetic
notions like expression and significant form serve to honor
certain kinds of artworks and their makers and to delineate
features that distinguish excellence from mediocrity. They also
serve to smother attention to the sexual politics of
representation.[20] Korsmeyer examines the important
distinction between art and non-art through Dickie's
institutional theory, which asks "not what makes a work
aesthetically valuable but what qualifies it to be called 'art' at
all"; and Danto's historical/theoretical theory ("Art these days
has very little to do with esthetic responses," quoted by
Korsmeyer on page 116). She summarizes, in a statement
aesthetically-enamored music educators might do well to
consider carefully: "What artworks share is not any perceptual
quality (such as beauty or significant form or the expressed
visions of artistic genius) but is rather a relational quality with
art traditions unfolding within culture" (p. 117).
Perhaps the most provocative and most easily misunderstood
aspect of Korsmeyer's book is her treatment of what she
designates "difficult pleasures"-the disgust or revulsion she
suggests constitutes a contemporary parallel to one of the
aesthetic hallmarks of the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
sublimity.[21] Although I will not attempt a thorough
examination of her arguments here, it is important to
understand her basic one. Because of the ways gendered
binaries have been implicated in the neglect and denigration of
the feminine and of women, feminist theorists and artists
"have a particular stake in mind-body debates," she explains
(p. 132). By evoking disgust, "above all others the most
physical, visceral emotion," some contemporary feminist artists
challenge directly the traditional doctrines conflating art with
beauty and the pleasure of disinterested contemplation. Unlike
modern aesthetic discourses that were rooted in theories of
pleasure,[22] she explains, contemporary and in particular,
feminist perspectives often resist affirmation and the evocation
of comforting emotions, deliberately evoking emotions instead
that are "difficult, painful, and aversive" (p. 136). An
important part of such artistic endeavors is the "shocking
disruption of traditions of aesthetic value" (p. 133)[23].
5. Musical Experience as Aesthetic
Whether music is capable of evoking the kind of disgust
Korsmeyer describes is an interesting question that need not
detain us here. But even if disgust and revulsion are beyond
music's capacities, the broader issue warrants consideration.
The polite tastes and detached, disembodied appreciation
associated with modern aesthetic theory, and to which, note

once more, most versions of the aesthetic rationale for music
education appeal directly and centrally, are relatively poor fits
to many of the things many people find so compelling about
musical experience: the impulses Nietzsche designated
Dionysian - energy, disorder, unruliness, the visceral - the
very satisfactions, one might say, of musical action.[24]
There are two possibilities that warrant consideration here.
The first has already been introduced: that the acceptance of
the aesthetic norms of modern theory tends to marginalize
significant realms of musical practice that do not conform to
its defining characteristics. The second, though related,
deserves equally explicit consideration: that it distorts
perception and understanding of what people are doing when
they engage in music as musicians. It tends to subordinate
musical action to works or pieces, reducing the point of
musical engagement to faithful production of consumable, i.e.,
listenable artifacts. As a receptive stance, the aesthetic
orientation to music neglects the importance of musical
agency; and, as a formally-oriented stance, it tends to neglect
in musical experience dimensions that contribute importantly
even to the value of the traditional canon: the timbral, the
Dionysian, the corporeal, and so on.
Regardless of one's philosophical stance on the particular issue
of musical disgust, these concerns should remind us of the
extreme fragility and porosity of the borders between and
among sound, music, and noise.[25] It is not just that people
who reject traditional norms are considered non-musicians; it
is also that the intentionality, habit and identity so closely
bound up in musical experience are such that sound perceived
to lie outside the range of musical sound -- a range whose
borders are both constructed and variable -- is simply not
music.[26] Sound asserting musical status can be and often is
a presence that is variously annoying, invasive or revulsive.
The use of Frank Sinatra recordings for psychological
punishment; of Bruce Springsteen recordings as psychological
weapons; of recorded classical music to keep "undesirables"
from congregating in certain public places; and of music as an
instrument of torture: each of these points to musical power
that goes well beyond the kinds envisioned by modern
aesthetic theory.[27]
The questions I have tried to raise here, taking Korsmeyer's
book as a point of departure, are (a) whether and how the
assertion that music's value is primarily aesthetic, as that is
conventionally understood, can be sustained; and (b) whether
music's value should be regarded as primarily, intrinsically,
inherently or exclusively musical, when that term is taken by
definition to implicate the exclusions of modern aesthetic
theory.[28] My response to both questions is "No." The
differences between music as an occasion for aesthetic
experience and music as human, social praxis, and the
differences, in turn, between aesthetic education and music
education are not just noteworthy, but potentially profound.
Music education conceived as aesthetic education necessarily
neglects, and even excludes, critical dimensions of musicmaking as a mode of human action or praxis. The focus of
aesthetically conceived music education is pieces rather than
events; entities rather than actions; properties rather than
uses; listening rather than making. Music considered as praxis

- as a form of practical knowledge and a mode of human
action - embraces many things of instructional significance
that aesthetic theory has been deliberately crafted to exclude.
Aesthetic engagement is one mode of musical praxis and an
optional one, not the whole of it. [29]
At issue, ultimately, is whether, given the sexism and
inequality that are part of the very origins of the concept of
fine art, the aesthetic can be rehabilitated. Does the nature of
the aesthetic mean that its endorsement introduces sexism
and inequality into the very structures of what we teach? Is
resistance possible within such a framework or does its
attendant conceptual territory preordain the marginality of
musical attempts to modify or subvert its assumptions,
because of their presumed extra-musical or sub-musical status
as performance art or as music that is merely popular, not the
genuine article?[30]
In closing, let me turn briefly to one of Korsmeyer's particular
interests, one I have so far neglected: the tastes, figurative
and literal, associated with food and its preparation. I believe
that her conclusions about food's potential status as an art
form warrant our careful consideration. Korsmeyer specifically
resists the appellation "art form" because it "does not do
justice to the complexity of food practices and their
significance."[31] More specifically, she argues that in order to
qualify as an art form, food would have to be capable of the
"disinterested" savoring requisite of specifically aesthetic
attention. "I would not call cuisine a fine art," she writes,
"because too much is sacrificed for the gain of a label."[32]
Despite widespread criticism and attempts to extend their
range, such classificatory terms have conceptual baggage that
is not easily set aside.
As I read these statements, I cannot help but substitute
"music" for "cuisine." The fit is an apt one. This disposes me to
ask how the fine-art concept of music has shaped and
continues to shape our assumptions of what music is and
about which (i.e., whose) music is the proper focus of formal
instruction. What in our understandings of the nature and
value of music and music education has been sacrificed "for
the gain of a label?" My personal list would begin with things
like our appreciation of music's radical diversity, music's social
and political significance, music's complicity in issues of power,
music's profound linkage to individual and collective identity,
music's fundamental transience and ambiguity, music's
corporeal, sonorous, and timbral roots, and music's
considerable capacity for ends both good and bad, on different
levels, and often at one and the same time. These issues have
been conspicuous in their absence from musical and
educational studies, and for reasons, I am suggesting, that are
hardly random. The cost of a label has been significant.
For the field of philosophical aesthetics, which has been nearly
as slow as music education to integrate feminist perspectives,
the challenges are equally significant. The gendered binary
oppositions around which Korsmeyer has chosen to structure
her book - these hierarchical dualities - are among the
templates that powerfully frame theoretical thinking. Since
they are more often the tools of thinking than the objects of
thought and critical scrutiny, their pervasiveness and

tenaciousness too often go undetected, facts that make their
consideration not just an indispensable starting point for
feminist analysis but for philosophical analysis more broadly.
Endnotes
[1] This essay is drawn from a more extended editorial
introduction to issue 5:1 (January 2006) of the on-line journal,
Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education (ACT). The
issue consists of critical analyses and commentaries on
Korsmeyer's book, written by five music and music education
scholars. These were followed by a response from Carolyn
Korsmeyer (mas.siue.edu/ACT/index.html).
[2] Sometimes labeled MEAE: music education as aesthetic
education.
[3] It is this capacity of the term "aesthetic" to mean so many
contradictory things that disposes me to avoid use of the term.
I believe I speak and write with greater clarity as a result. I
invite readers to join me in asking, as I now do whenever I
encounter the word: (a) precisely what it is intended to mean
in the context at hand; whether (b) it adds something
indispensable to the point being made; or whether, on the
other hand, it (c) could be deleted-or changed, say, to
"musical"-without consequence. My answer to (a) is most
often, "Who knows?" while my responses to (b) and (c) are
frequently negative and positive, respectively. Note: my
criticisms do not mean that I deny experiencing in some
musical circumstances things some might wish to call
"aesthetic"-but rather that I think more apt and more useful
descriptions are generally available.
[4] By, one is tempted to say, disciples and true believers.
[5] To some, regrettably, these debates seemed pointlessmatters of no consequence to the business at hand: teaching
and learning music, pure and simple. I say "regrettably"
because of the extraordinary naivet- of such "practical"
stances.
[6] Renouncing such claims has been crucial, for instance, to
the acknowledgement of musical diversity and cultural
pluralism.
[7] To ask whose needs and interests it served, and whose it
did not, is therefore a revealing question when it comes to
understanding the heat of the debates.
[8] Since readers outside the music education profession may
find this reference to "comforting, inspiring claims" obscure, I
will elaborate briefly. The "aesthetic rationale" for music
education was and is essentially an advocacy argument, one
primarily intended to serve the political end of substantiating
music's (and thus, apparently, music education's) inherent or
unqualified worth. Claims like the following are typical: Music
exalts the human spirit. It enhances the quality of life. It
brings joy, satisfaction, and fulfillment to every human being.
Music is sound that is used to explore and understand the
realm of human subjective reality, the patterns of sentience.
Aesthetic education (and music education that is aesthetic in
orientation) thus involves the education of feeling, which
enhances the quality of the "inner life" by making people more

aesthetically discriminating and sensitive. By teaching people
"how feelings go," studying (good, quality) music balances
intellect's coolness with the warmth of emotion. Music provides
a direct link to students' inner lives. In short, music education
is the education of human feeling through the development of
responsiveness to music's intrinsically expressive qualities.
(Note: A pivotal assumption underlying these claims is that
music's value is intrinsic, which precludes consideration of
musics notable for their connections to things deemed
intrinsic. An instructional corollary is that the exclusive aims of
teaching are (a) full and proper perception of "the musical
elements" and (b) heightened feelingful reaction to them.)
[9] Parenthetical insertion mine.
[10] The ideal was, as Peter Kivy's title would have it, Music
Alone, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
[11] Or, more accurately, given the claim to subjective
universality: simultaneously immediate, particular, and
general. Among the important corollaries of these claims is
that meaning somehow inheres in musical works in a form that
is perennially available and intrinsically valuable. In
educational theory, this latter assumption disposes the kind of
perennialism that ignores the historicity and social construction
of musical meanings.
[12] This, in turn, because of a need to distinguish people
whose claims were warranted from those who were not.
[13] To be more specific, and perhaps fairer to Kant, he did
draw a distinction between ideal or pure beauty on the one
hand, and adherent or dependent beauty (judgments related
to what things of 'this kind' are supposed to do: a love song,
for instance) on the other. The problem was that Kant extolled
the former and subsequent philosophers ignored the latter,
thus effectively transforming a theory of ideal beauty into a
theory of art.
[14] See, for instance, Janet Wolff, The Social Production of
Art (New York: New York University Press, 1984); Preben
Mortensen, Art in the Social Order: The Making of the Modern
Conception of Art (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997); Larry Shiner,
The Invention of Art: A Cultural History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001); and Austin Harrington, Art and Social
Theory (Polity Press, 2004).
[15] In music, heated debates have raged about whether
issues like gender, sex, race, and power have any place in the
study of the canon, since the proper focus of musicology is
"the music itself." This latter stance has the effect of declaring,
not only certain questions illegitimate and out of bounds, but
also certain musical practices, their practitioners, and those
concerned to raise the issues in the first place. To ask the
curricular question "which music" is thus also to ask "whose
music," "whose ways of engaging," "whose political priorities,"
and "who gets to say?" The entry of jazz into the academy
was quite belated for these reasons, and popular music studies
are still relegated primarily to cultural studies programs rather
than music programs. It is worth noting as well that questions
like "what should one listen for in music," and "what makes a
music worthy of study" are also implicated, so that non-

structural musical attributes like timbre are rendered marginal
considerations.
[16] Note that this "older," modernist aesthetic tradition is
invariably the tradition invoked by music education philosophy.
The Langerian philosophy of Bennett Reimer is one of the
more prominent examples: Reimer, A Philosophy of Music
Education (Prentice Hall, 1970, 1989, 2002). See ACT 2:1,
2003, for recent critiques and a response by Reimer. Note,
too, that "newer," postmodern aesthetic traditions are
designated "aesthetic" primarily in virtue of their inclusion in
the academic philosophical field historically designated
"aesthetics." (Indeed, even "anti-aesthetic" positions often
appear under the aesthetic umbrella.) The adjective
"aesthetic" and the noun "aesthetics" have very different
references.
[17] It might be fairly objected that there exist aesthetic
theories that avoid such biases-Dewey's experiential theory,
for instance. However, whether Dewey succeeds in bridging
this most fundamental of dualisms remains to be seen; and
that his attempted re-definition of "aesthetic experience" failed
to radically reorient the field-at least to date-is arguably
beyond dispute. Part of the problem, it might be argued,
stems from Dewey's failure to assign musical experience a
central place in his accounts.
[18] A notion that is itself much debated, since if "aesthetic
experience" serves to gratify, it is not "for itself" after all.
[19] Thus Korsmeyer designates it "deep gender."
[20] Musics and musical practices developed with the explicit
intent of foregrounding these politics of representation are not
acknowledged as music-since they do not do what it is
assumed legitimate music must. The dilemma is that the
master's tools, to use Audre Lorde's memorable imagery,
cannot dismantle the master's house. In music's case,
however, resorting to different tools seems to commit one to a
wholly different project, leaving the master's house intact. This
is almost certainly one reason there does not seem to be an
analogue to "feminist art" in music.
[21] In her ACT essay (see note 1 above), Korsmeyer qualifies
this claim in important ways.
[22] "Many philosophers identify beauty as a type of pleasure"
(p. 134).
[23] This resonates in certain ways with Adorno's conviction
that music is obligated to resist and challenge, although he
hardly came to these convictions through feminism! Nor, of
course, would he have condoned a deliberate or direct attempt
to evoke disgust.
[24] Again, it is important to acknowledge that alternatives to
modern accounts of aesthetic experience exist-although they
were decidedly not invoked in music education's "aesthetic
rationale" (and, had they been, would have led to strikingly
different claims and conclusions). Consider, for instance: "From
the pragmatist point of view, aesthetic experience is not
characterized only as disinterested contemplation of art works
and other elements of our environments of our environment as

objects of perception. Aesthetic experience is intertwined with
different social and cultural practices in the flux of our
everyday life." Or, more directly, "Action, practice and
movement are epistemologically significant elements of
experience. The environment is not just perceived, it is
experienced by acting, moving around and participating in
different practices. . . " Pentti Määttänen, "Aesthetics of
Movement and Everyday Aesthetics," in Contemporary
Aesthetics, Special Vol. 1 (2005).
www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?
articleID=347.
[25] I have attempted to explore the fragility of these
boundaries in my "Sound, Society, and Music 'Proper,'" in
Philosophy of Music Education Review, vol. 2 no. 1 (Spring
1994) 14-24; and in my "Sound, Sociality, and Music" (Parts I
& II), in The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning,
vol. V no. 3 (Fall, 1994) 50-67.
[26] What I have in mind here is the ease with which music
becomes non-music, the ease with which a change in context
or intentionality transforms music into noise. Sound has what
has been aptly described as a peremptory immediacy. (D.
Burrows, Sound, Speech, and Music (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1990). This accounts for our sense of
oneness with music ("you are the music while the music lasts"
[T.S. Eliot, 'The Dry Salvages,' in Four Quartets (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1988]), but also means that
unwanted sound, even if 'musical' for someone else (or for
oneself, on another occasion), is experienced as invasive,
intrusive, as noise. Intentionality thus has a great deal to do
with the distinction between music and noise, and the frequent
absence of middle ground.
[27] The Sinatra reference is to a teacher reported to use
Sinatra recordings to make after school detention more
distasteful and punitive for students. The Springsteen
reference is to the U.S. military's use of Springsteen
recordings to help drive dictator Manuel Noriega from his
secure compound. The use of classical music reputedly keeps
youth from congregating and loitering in shopping malls.
Music's broader use as an instrument of torture is frequently
mentioned in the mainstream media: the music of Christina
Aguilera has been used for such purposes by U.S. forces in
"Gitmo Camp" at Guantanamo Bay.
[28] I concede that this implication need not be granted.
However, its existence is historically factual in the literature on
music education.
[29] To acknowledge its limitations is simply, one might say,
to concede that it is not universal-a view from everywhere or
from nowhere. In a human world, this is hardly a radical
notion.
[30] This question is raised by Elizabeth Keathley in her essay
review of Korsmeyer's book.
[31] Korsmeyer's 'Response' essay in Action, Criticism, and
Theory for Music Education (ACT), 5:1 (January 2006)
www.siue.edu/MUSIC/ACTPAPERS/v5/Korsmeyer5_1.pdf, p. 7.

[32] Ibid., p. 8.
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